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I. Introduction 
In a recent speech, National Security Advisor John Bolton 
delivered remarks on “Protecting American Constitutionalism and 
Sovereignty from International Threats.”1  In his remarks, Bolton 
announced a new American policy vis-à-vis the International Criminal 
Court (ICC or Court).  According to Bolton, the ICC “has been 
ineffective, unaccountable, and indeed, outright dangerous.”2  While 
Bolton, and others in the Trump Administration, are at liberty to 
craft new policies, it is important that such policies be based on 
accurate facts, and on an accurate understanding of the law.  This 
Article will highlight factual errors from Bolton’s remarks, and it will 
criticize some of Bolton’s arguments as misguided and contrary to the 
United States’ interests.  In order to do so, this Article will first 
provide a brief background on the establishment and jurisdictional 
mechanisms of the ICC (Part II).  Next, this Article will analyze 
Bolton’s remarks and the new American policy, announced therein, 
regarding the ICC (Part III).  Finally, this Article will propose how 
the United States could engage more constructively with the ICC, and 
 
* Professor of Law and Associate Dean for Academic Enrichment, 
Cleveland-Marshall College of Law.  The author would like to thank the 
organizers of the Frederick K. Cox International Law Center’s 2018 
conference on “International Law and Policy in the Age of Trump” for 
the opportunity to present a version of this Article. 
1. John Bolton, Nat’l Sec. Advisor, Speech at the Federalist Society in 
Washington D.C. (Sept. 10, 2018), available at 
https://www.justsecurity.org/60674/national-security-adviser-john-
bolton-remarks-international-criminal-court/ [https://perma.cc/NP6P-
2USM] [hereinafter “Bolton’s Remarks”].   
2. Id. 
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how such engagement would advance American interests (Part IV).  
This Article will conclude that the newly announced policy vis-à-vis 
the ICC will be detrimental to the United States’ interests in the 
global community, as well as destructive for the global fight against 
impunity.   
II. Background on the ICC 
The ICC is the only permanent international criminal tribunal.3  
Its Statute (“Rome Statute”) was negotiated in 1998, and the Court 
became operational in 2002.4  The ICC is located at The Hague, and 
the Rome Statute provides that the Court has prospective 
jurisdiction, starting in 2002.5  The Court can properly exercise 
jurisdiction over situations where crimes have been committed on the 
territory of an ICC state party, or where crimes have been committed 
by a national of an ICC state party.6  In terms of subject-matter 
jurisdiction, the Court can prosecute individuals accused of four main 
categories of crimes: genocide, crimes against humanity, crimes of 
aggression, and war crimes.7  Starting in 2017, the crime of aggression 
was added to the Court’s Rome Statute, although negotiations 
surrounding the addition were contentious and resulted in a complex 
mechanism, whereby states can opt out of jurisdiction over this 
crime.8  Cases can appear before the ICC in three different ways: the 
United Nations Security Council can refer a case to the ICC 
prosecutor; any state party to the ICC can refer a case to the 
prosecutor; or, the prosecutor can initiate an investigation on her 
own.9  Thus far, the ICC has investigated or prosecuted over twenty-
six individuals and eleven situations.10   
 
3. INT’L CRIM. COURT, https://www.icc-cpi.int/about 
[https://perma.cc/4LWM-EAYN].  
4. Id. 
5. Id. 
6. Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court art. 12, Jul. 17, 1998, 
2187 U.N.T.S. 90 [hereinafter Rome Statute]. This pre-condition to the 
exercise of ICC’s jurisdiction does not apply to cases which are referred 
to the Court by the United Nations Security Council. Id.  
7. Rome Statute, supra note 6, art. 5.  
8. For a detailed discussion of negotiations regarding the addition of the 
crime of aggression to the Rome Statute, see Jennifer Trahan, From 
Kampala to New York—The Final Negotiations to Activate the 
Jurisdiction of the International Criminal Court over the Crime of 
Aggression, 18 INT’L CRIM. L. REV. 197 (2018). 
9. Rome Statute, supra note 6, art. 13. 
10. Situations and Cases, INT’L CRIM. CT., https://www.icc-cpi.int/# 
[https://perma.cc/68EV-NVZP]. 
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The ICC’s reach is further limited by two conditions related to 
admissibility of cases: gravity and complementarity.11  As it will be 
discussed below, in order for a case to be admissible before the ICC, 
such a case needs to involve crimes of sufficient gravity; moreover, 
national jurisdictions can preempt an ICC prosecution, by notifying 
the Court that they are able and willing to investigate the relevant 
case: the principle of complementarity.12  Thus, these principles—
gravity and complementarity—pose an additional admissibility hurdle 
for potential ICC prosecutions.   
III. Bolton’s Remarks and the New American Policy on 
the ICC 
National Security Advisor John Bolton delivered a speech on 
September 10, 2018, in which he announced a new United States’ 
policy vis-à-vis the ICC.13  Bolton’s remarks contained several errors 
regarding the ICC’s structure, jurisdictional reach, and internal 
accountability mechanisms.  This section will outline some of these 
errors.  In addition, this section will highlight some of Bolton’s 
remarks that contained new policy guidelines vis-à-vis the ICC, where 
such guidelines are misguided and detrimental to United States’ 
interests.   
Bolton argued in his speech that “[t]he ICC and its Prosecutor 
had been granted potentially enormous, essentially unaccountable 
powers, and alongside numerous other glaring and significant flaws, 
the International Criminal Court constituted an assault on the 
constitutional rights of the American People and the sovereignty of 
the United States.”14  It is incorrect that the ICC and its Prosecutor 
have “enormous” or “unaccountable powers.”  The ICC’s jurisdiction 
is limited temporally as well as rationae materiae: the Court has 
prospective jurisdiction, starting in 2002, and it can only exercise 
jurisdiction over genocide, crimes against humanity and war crimes.15  
The crime of aggression was recently added to the Court’ Statute, but 
the addition was complex and will require states to “opt-in” to 
 
11. Rome Statute, supra note 6, art. 17. 
12. Id; see also David Tolbert, International Criminal Law: Past and 
Future, 30 U. PA. J. INT’L L. 1281, 1293 (2009) (discussing the principle 
of complementarity and its implications for the International Criminal 
Court).  
13. Bolton’s Remarks, supra note 1.  
14. Id.  
15. Rome Statute, supra note 6, arts. 5, 11.  As mentioned above, the crime 
of aggression has been added to the Rome Statute in 2017, although 
states can elect to opt out of jurisdiction over the crime of aggression. 
Trahan, supra note 8.  
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jurisdiction over this new crime.16  In addition, the ICC is constrained 
by the application of principles of gravity and 
complementarity.17  The ICC was established to exercise its 
jurisdiction over persons for the most serious crimes of international 
concern. Article 17(1)(d) of the Rome Statute provides that a case is 
inadmissible before the ICC if the case is not of sufficient gravity to 
justify further action by the Court.18  Thus, cases which involve less 
“serious” crimes may not satisfy the ICC’s gravity threshold and may 
never be prosecuted before this Court.19  In addition, the ICC is not 
supposed to interfere with national prosecutions, and the Court 
should only prosecute suspects if a state is not able or willing to 
prosecute.20 According to Article 17(1)(a) of the Rome Statute, a case 
is inadmissible when it is being investigated or prosecuted by a state 
that has jurisdiction over it, unless the state is genuinely unwilling or 
unable to carry out the investigation or prosecution.21 In other words, 
if a state is able and willing to prosecute an individual, that state 
should be given the opportunity to do so, and the ICC should step 
away.22  Thus, in light of the Court’s jurisdictional limitations as well 
as important admissibility requirements, it is inaccurate to claim that 
the ICC has “enormous” powers.  
Moreover, it is incorrect to claim that the ICC has 
“unaccountable” powers.  The Assembly of States Parties, consisting 
of states which are members of the ICC, is an important 
accountability mechanism over the Court.23  For example, judges can 
be removed by a two-thirds vote of states parties to the Rome 
Statute, and a prosecutor can be removed by a majority vote of states 
parties.24 Thus, to claim that the ICC somehow wields super-powers 
which transcend any accountability is simply false.   
 
16. For a detailed account of negotiations to add the crime of aggression to 
the Rome Statute, as well as the complex opt-out procedure available to 
ICC member states regarding jurisdiction over the crime of aggression, 
see Trahan, supra note 8. 
17. Rome Statute, supra note 6, art. 17. 
18. Id. 
19. For a detailed analysis of the ICC’s application of the gravity threshold, 
see Margaret M. DeGuzman, The International Criminal Court’s 
Gravity Jurisprudence at Ten, 12 WASH. U. GLOBAL STUD. L. REV. 475 
(2013). 
20. Rome Statute, supra note 6, art. 17. 
21. Id. 
22. Tolbert, supra note 12, at 1288-89. 
23. Assembly of States Parties, INT’L CRIM. CT., https://www.icc-cpi.int/asp 
[https://perma.cc/QS2Q-5QLG]. 
24. Rome Statute, supra note 6, art. 46. 
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Finally, it is unclear why the establishment of the ICC constitutes 
a constitutional and sovereignty assault against the United 
States.  The ICC is a treaty-based body; any state, including the 
United States, is free to join or not to join this treaty.  If the United 
States chooses to join the ICC, or any other treaty, potential conflicts 
with the U.S. Constitution would be resolved through the Supremacy 
Clause, which establishes the primacy of the Constitution over any 
inconsistent treaty obligations.25  Thus, it is surprising and misleading 
to claim that the negotiation of a new treaty, like the ICC, is 
somehow a threat to the United States’ sovereignty or the role of its 
Constitution. 
Bolton also argued that, “the Court’s structure is contrary to 
fundamental American principles, including checks and balances on 
authority and the separation of powers…. The International Criminal 
Court, however, melds two of these branches together: the judicial 
and the executive. In the ICC structure, the executive branch—the 
Office of the Prosecutor—is an organ of the Court. The Framers of 
our Constitution considered such a melding of powers unacceptable 
for our own government, and we should certainly not accept it in the 
ICC. “26  This is a curious argument: while it may be true that the 
ICC does not espouse the same separation of powers structure that 
the United States government does, the United States cannot possibly 
expect that every treaty-based organization adopt American 
governance principles.  Multilateral treaties bind multiple nations 
together and often adopt compromise positions and the “lowest 
common denominator” of norms;27 it is not reasonable to expect that 
treaties would replicate United States’ constitutional 
structures.28 And, such replication is not constitutionally 
mandated.  The United States can become a member of various 
treaty-based bodies, so long as its obligations under such treaty 
mechanisms do not directly conflict with the Constitution.  Nothing 
in the ICC Statute would create such a constitutional conflict.  Thus, 
Bolton’s argument here is both surprising and unsupported by the 
Constitution. 
Moreover, Bolton argued that the ICC “claims ‘automatic 
jurisdiction,’ meaning that it can prosecute individuals even if their 
 
25. U.S. CONST. art. VI, § 2 (“This Constitution, and the laws of the United 
States which shall be made in pursuance thereof; and all treaties made, 
or which shall be made, under the authority of the United States, shall 
be the supreme law of the land.”). 
26. Bolton’s Remarks, supra note 1.  
27. See, e.g., GLOBAL SECURITY AND INTERNATIONAL POLITICAL ECONOMY 
143 (P. Bilgin, et al., eds. 2010) (describing the “lowest common 
denominator” in multilateral treaty negotiations). 
28. Id.   
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own governments have not recognized, signed, or ratified the 
treaty.”29  This is not true either: the ICC does not have automatic 
jurisdiction.  Article 12 of the Court’s Rome Statute posits that a 
precondition to the court’s exercise of jurisdiction is that the alleged 
crimes be committed by a national of a state party, or on the 
territory of a state party (or if a state accepts the court’s 
jurisdiction).30 Thus, while the ICC may be able to prosecute 
nationals of a non-party state,31  this situation is far from automatic, 
and may only occur if such nationals commit crimes on the territory 
of a state party. 
Bolton next claimed that the ICC Prosecutor’s request to 
investigate Americans for alleged detainee abuse in Afghanistan is “an 
utterly unfounded, unjustifiable investigation.”32  This investigation is 
not unfounded in and of itself; the investigation will permit the 
Prosecutor to ascertain enough facts to decide whether to go forward 
with any possible prosecutions.  Moreover, the investigation is not 
unjustifiable, as it falls within the Court’s mandate, and as potential 
prosecutions would satisfy the Court’s temporal and subject-matter 
jurisdiction (the alleged crimes took place after 2002, on the territory 
of a state party– Afghanistan).  If the Prosecutor determined that 
admissibility requirements, such as gravity and complementarity, 
were not met, she would not proceed with the case.  Thus, the 
possible investigation of crimes in Afghanistan, which may involve 
American nationals as perpetrators, is not “unfounded” or 
“unjustifiable” by any judicial or prosecutorial standards. 
Bolton proceeded to criticize the ICC because it “claims 
jurisdiction over crimes that have disputed and ambiguous definitions, 
exacerbating the Court’s unfettered powers.  The definitions of 
crimes, especially crimes of aggression, are vague and subject to wide-
ranging interpretation by the ICC.” 33 This claim is also inaccurate: 
the ICC Statute specifically defines the crimes over which the Court 
has jurisdiction,34 and the interpretation and application of these 
definitions is appropriately left in the hands of the Court’s judiciary, 
in the same manner that the interpretation and application of 
 
29. Bolton’s Remarks, supra note 1.  
30. Rome Statute, supra note 6, art. 12. 
31. Id. at art. 12(3). 
32. Bolton’s Remarks, supra note 1.  
33. Id.   
34. See Rome Statute, supra note 6, art. 6-8 (specifically listing crimes 
which are within the Court’s jurisdiction. Articles 6, 7, and 8 define the 
crimes of genocide, crimes against humanity, and war crimes. Thus, it is 
incorrect to claim that the crimes which are within the Court’s 
jurisdiction are ill-defined or vague).   
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domestic statutes is bestowed upon domestic judiciaries.  Bolton’s 
claim that the definitions of crimes within the ICC’s Statute are 
“disputed,” “ambiguous,” or “vague” is unsupported within the 
scholarly community, and unsupported by evidence from the Court’s 
negotiating record.35  The ICC Rome Statute was negotiated over 
weeks of strenuous academic, strategic and political debates; the 
Statute’s content is the result of impressive compromise and 
expertise.36  While some definitions of crimes may have been the 
subject of controversy and academic dispute, the end result was 
agreed upon by all member states, and has resulted in a Statute 
which is clear and unambiguous.37  In addition, customary norms of 
International Criminal Law espouse many of the same definitions of 
crimes and principles of law which are enshrined in the Rome 
Statute.38  In sum, Bolton was wrong in his claim that the ICC 
contains vague or ambiguous definitions of crimes.   
In addition, Bolton argued that the ICC would somehow claim 
universal jurisdiction.  ”The next obvious step is to claim complete, 
universal jurisdiction: the ability to prosecute anyone, anywhere for 
vague crimes identified by The Hague’s bureaucrats.”39  There is 
nothing in the ICC’s Statute to support this conclusion, and while the 
Rome Statute negotiating record reveals that different states held 
different views regarding the Court’s reach and structure, it is false to 
claim that any serious intentions existed to provide the Court with 
universal jurisdiction over “anyone” or over “vague crimes.”40 
 
35. For a detailed discussion of the Rome Statute negotiations, see FANNY 
BENEDETTI ET AL., NEGOTIATING THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT 
(2013); see also Phillippe Kirsch & John T. Holmes, The Rome 
Conference on an International Criminal Court: The Negotiating 
Process, 93 AM. J. INT’L L. 2 (1999) (discussing the negotiating process 
for the establishment of an International Criminal Court). 
36. Id. 
37. For a detailed academic discussion of the various substantive provisions 
of the ICC’s Rome Statute, see Antonio Cassese, The Statute of the 
International Criminal Court: Some Preliminary Reflections, 10 EUR J. 
INT’L L. 144 (1999). 
38. For a discussion of the relationship between the Rome Statute and 
customary international law, see, e.g., Jan Wouters, The Obligation to 
Prosecute International Law Crimes, https://www.law.kuleuven.be/iir/ 
nl/onderzoek/opinies/obligationtoprosecute.pdf; see also Leila Nadya 
Sadat, Custom, Codification and Some Thoughts About the Relationship 
Between the Two: Article 10 of the ICC Statute, 49 DEPAUL L. Rᴇᴠ. 
909 (2000) (discussing the role of Article 10 in international law). 
39. Bolton’s Remarks, supra note 1.  
40. For a discussion of the ICC Rome Statute’s negotiating history, see 
BENEDETTI ET AL., supra note 35. 
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Finally, some of Bolton’s claims were, while not completely 
factually inaccurate, misguided and contrary to United States’ 
interests.  First, Bolton claimed that the ICC is ineffective, as it has 
spent too much money, has prosecuted few individuals, and has not 
deterred the commission of atrocities in places such as the Democratic 
Republic of Congo, Sudan, Libya, or Syria.41  This may be a fair 
criticism of the Court, but accepting such criticism could lead one to 
adopt a pro-ICC policy: to support the Court, and to ensure that the 
Court has better funding and better opportunities to truly deter the 
commission of atrocities, through its investigative and prosecutorial 
mechanisms.42  This approach would benefit both the Court and all 
states which are committed to principles of accountability and 
individual criminal responsibility (United States should be positioned 
as a leader within this group of countries).   
Second, Bolton claimed that the ICC is superfluous, because of 
superior United States’ judicial and ethical standards.43 According to 
Bolton, we do not need the ICC because the United States can handle 
its own investigations much better.44 Bolton argued that the ICC’s 
application of the complementarity principle is “farcical” and that the 
Prosecutor will decide which investigation to pursue based on political 
motives.45  While the ICC has been criticized on complementarity 
grounds (in the Libya case in particular), there is nothing to suggest 
that the Prosecutor does not consider complementarity issues 
seriously in each case that has been initiated with the Court.46  And, 
even accepting that the United States’ judicial system is superior to 
the ICC, one could imagine a situation where the United States is 
unwilling to investigate its own wrongdoing; the ICC’s role is to act in 
such situations and to provide justice and accountability against 
 
41. Bolton’s Remarks, supra note 1.   
42. See, e.g., Jane Stromseth, Why Bolton’s Assault on the ICC is Not in 
the U.S. Interest, JUST SECURITY (Sept. 14, 2018), 
https://www.justsecurity.org/60743/boltons-assault-icc-u-s-interests/ 
[https://perma.cc/V39Y-55MM] (arguing that “the ICC is a very 
imperfect institution, with many limitations and challenges. But it 
should not be blamed for the failures that stem from lack of support for 
its work or matters outside its jurisdiction”).  
43. Bolton’s Remarks, supra note 1.   
44. Id.  
45. Id. 
46. See, e.g., Jennifer Trahan, Guest Post: A Complementarity Challenge 
Gone Awry - The ICC and the Libya Warrants, OPINIOJURIS (Sept. 4, 
2015), http://opiniojuris.org/2015/09/04/guest-post-a-complementarity-
challenge-gone-awry-the-icc-and-the-libya-warrants/ 
[https://perma.cc/8NWQ-XGRF] (discussing ICC jurisdiction in the 
Libya case). 
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perpetrators whose home countries choose to shield them.47  As 
several commentators have already pointed out, the best thing that 
the United States can do, if faced with the potential ICC 
investigation, is to ensure that American perpetrators of potential 
abuses are thoroughly investigated in the United States’ military or 
criminal system.48  In this manner, the principle of complementarity 
would preclude the ICC from continuing to investigate, because the 
United States would have demonstrated its willingness and ability to 
prosecute on its own.  
Last but not least, most troubling in Bolton’s speech was his 
threat against those who cooperate with the ICC.  ”We will respond 
against the ICC and its personnel to the extent permitted by U.S. 
law.  We will ban its judges and prosecutors from entering the United 
States. We will sanction their funds in the U.S. financial system, and, 
we will prosecute them in the U.S. criminal system. We will do the 
same for any company or state that assists an ICC investigation of 
Americans.”49  It is absolutely within the United States’ sovereignty 
to refuse to issue visas/entry to ICC officials who may be foreign 
nationals (although this would be terrible policy).50 However, it is 
simply unbelievable to announce that the United States would 
prosecute ICC officials, and other companies or states who assist the 
ICC in the U.S. domestic system.  ICC officials are highly respected 
experts in international criminal law: judges, prosecutors, 
investigators, and other individuals who have committed their careers 
to the pursuit of international justice.  Those who assist or have 
assisted the ICC include our colleagues—the most prominent experts 
in international criminal law who have provided advice and expertise 
to the Court.  What crimes have such individuals committed under 
 
47. See Stromseth, supra note 42 (“Working to build stronger accountability 
for mass atrocities - in national courts when possible, in hybrid courts, 
and before the ICC - together can reinforce the fundamental 
prohibitions against atrocity crimes and bolster prospects for their 
prevention.”). 
48. Id.; see also Milena Sterio, Commentary on John Bolton’s Speech 
Regarding New American Policy on the International Criminal Court, 
INTLAWGRRLS (Sept. 10, 2018), 
https://ilg2.org/2018/09/10/commentary-on-john-boltons-speech-
regarding-new-american-policy-on-the-international-criminal-court/ 
[https://perma.cc/85MW-K42N] (discussing the factual errors within 
Bolton’s Remarks on “Protecting American Constitutionalism and 
Sovereignty from International Threats”). 
49. Bolton’s Remarks, supra note 1.   
50. Know Your Rights: What to do When Encountering Law Enforcement 
at Airports and Other Ports of Entry into the U.S., ACLU, 
https://www.aclu.org/know-your-rights/what-do-when-encountering-
law-enforcement-airports-and-other-ports-entry-us 
[https://perma.cc/6FTD-LBP9]. 
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United States law? And, how would such prosecutions (even if 
grounded in U.S. law) affect the United States’ role in international 
relations and in the world community? John Bolton’s speech is both 
factually inaccurate as well as misguided, and a new American policy 
vis-à-vis the ICC, built on Bolton’s remarks, will be detrimental to 
our own interests and our position in the global community. 
IV. Conclusion: A Better Policy Vis-à-vis the ICC: 
Constructive Engagement  
As opposed to stating that the ICC is “dead to us,” as Bolton 
did,51 it would be in the United States’ interests to constructively 
engage with the Court and to support its mandate.  While the United 
States is not a state party to the Rome Statute,52 nothing precludes 
the United States from working to support the work of the Court, in 
order to foster the global goal of ending impunity.  The United States 
could adopt a pro-ICC policy, which would allow the United States to 
work with the Court—through funding and other investigative and 
prosecutorial support.  In addition, the United States could encourage 
other countries to support the ICC in a similar fashion.  The United 
States could also work with the Court as well as with other national 
jurisdictions to build prosecutorial capacity over atrocity crimes, as 
well as to enhance prospects for their prevention.  Such constructive 
engagement with the court would not undermine United States’ 
interests, and would advance both American and global interests in 
ending impunity and deterring the commission of atrocity crimes. As 
Jane Stromseth has argued,  
We can protect U.S. personnel and U.S. interests effectively 
without assaulting and undercutting the possibilities for justice 
for victims of egregious atrocities that the ICC can offer, or its 
work in catalyzing meaningful accountability at the national 
level—the primary and most important foundation for justice 
and the rule of law.53 
In sum, Bolton’s newly announced ICC policy is based on 
erroneous facts. It is misguided, and contrary to the United States’ 
national security interests and to the global goals of justice.   
 
51. Bolton’s Remarks, supra note 1.   
52. The States Parties to the Rome Statute, ICC, https://asp.icc-
cpi.int/en_menus/asp/states%20parties/pages 
/the%20states%20parties%20to%20the%20rome%20statute.aspx 
[https://perma.cc/2W6G-X3VM]. 
53. Stromseth, supra note 42.  
